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Introduction
One of the most important rights guaranteed to Americans is in the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. That amendment states:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.
This amendment is not only one of the most important rights, but one that is constantly
being interpreted and defined in courtrooms across the country. Since the First
Amendment was adopted as part of the Bill of Rights in 1791 court decisions have helped
to develop its meaning. 1 An issue of free speech came about in Portland, Oregon,
recently when one man displayed his feelings about a new aerial tram that passed directly
over his house.
In 2006 the City of Portland completed an aerial tram that connected the South
Waterfront to the Oregon Health and Science University. The tram consists of two cars
that can carry a maximum of 79 people per car. The cars depart about every five minutes
during peak operating hours. The tram was built by the city to help connect the South
Waterfront to the Marquam Hill, to help spur economic development due to OHSU’s
recent expansions and to promote urban renewal.
While many people were excited about the new tram, many others were against it.
One group of people that fiercely opposed the tram was the homeowners that lived
directly under its path. Many of these homeowners were concerned that the tram would
lower their property values and would also be an invasion of their privacy. The
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homeowners were concerned about the hundreds of people each day that would now be
able to see into their previously private backyards. Due to these concerns, one
homeowner decided to stand up and voice his opinion.
Justin Auld owned a home that was directly under the path of the new aerial tram.
He was upset that his backyard, which had previously been private, could now be seen by
any person riding the tram. Portland city officials had previously told Auld and his
neighbors that this was not going to happen. After Auld discovered that people could in
fact see into his backyard he decided to hang a sign on the roof of his house that
expressed his feelings for the tram. In large, black letters on a white background the sign
read: “FUCK THE TRAM.” 2
When people riding the tram saw the sign many thought it was funny, while
others thought that it was tasteless. Portland city officials soon became involved and they
told Auld that he was going to have to take the sign down. By April 27, 2007, the sign
was taken down from the roof and hung on a nearby fence; the work fuck was folded
underneath the sign so that it was hidden from view and only “THE TRAM” was legible.
The city was successful in prohibiting Auld from expressing his feelings about the tram.
The Oregon Constitution even more broadly and clearly protects the rights of its
citizens to free speech than the U.S. Constitution. Article one, section eight of the Oregon
Constitution states,
No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or
restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever;
but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this right.
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This constitutional right makes it impossible for any law to restrict speech solely based
upon the vulgarity of words used.
According to the preferred position balancing theory, the right to free expression
guaranteed by the First Amendment and article one, section eight of the Oregon
Constitution, is held at a higher status than all other societal concerns. In this case the
government is trying to censor ideas that Auld has about the tram. This theory presumes
that any action the government takes that limits freedom of expression to protect other
interests in unconstitutional. “This presumption forces the government to bear the burden
of proof in any legal action challenging censorship.”3 According to this theory the City
of Portland must prove that their censorship of Auld’s sign is justified so that they are not
violating the First Amendment and Article one, section eight of the Oregon Constitution..
Another legal theory of the First Amendment that relates to this case is the
Meiklejohnian theory. This theory states that “expression that relates to the selfgoverning process must be protected absolutely by the First Amendment.” 4 What this
means is that political speech gets absolute protection. Ever since the tram was proposed
it was a very contentious topic, not only among the area where Auld’s home is but
throughout the greater Portland area. The tram was a political topic of debate, and under
the Meiklejohnian theory, speech related to it should be given the fullest protection.
The government is also restricted in the ways that it can enforce prior censorship
on communication, such as laws that regulate signs and billboards. These are called time,
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place and manner restrictions.5 The criteria that have been set is that rules must be
content neutral, rules can not constitute a complete ban on a kind of communication, the
rule must be justified by a substantial state interest, and the rule must be narrowly
tailored. 6
This study will examine the First Amendment of the United States Constitution,
the freedom of speech rights provided in the Oregon Constitution, the Portland city sign
statutes and time, place and manner restrictions. It will explore whether or not the City of
Portland sign statutes violate constitutionally provided rights to free speech and
expression. The purpose of this study is to weigh the city’s legitimate concerns to
regulate signs in residential neighborhoods and its citizens from profanity versus Justin
Auld’s right to express his ideas freely.
The sign that Auld placed on his roof was on his private property and expressed
his attitudes toward the tram that glided past his house. This paper will argue that when
the City of Portland told Auld to take the sign down from his roof, it infringed on his
constitutional right to freedom of speech as guaranteed by both the First Amendment and
the Oregon Constitution.
Facts of the Case
Justin Auld was told by tram officials that the new aerial tram was not going to
invade on his privacy. When the tram was finally built, he discovered that anyone riding
on the tram would be able to see directly into his backyard. That was when Auld decided
to do something about it.
Auld had a large sign professionally made that said in large black letters on a
5
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white background “FUCK THE TRAM.” On April 23, 2007, Auld hung the sign on the
roof of his house. The sign was clearly visible from the aerial tram, but it was not visible
from the street. Due to the pitch of the roof, the sign could not be seen by other people in
houses on the hill above Auld’s house.
On April 27, 2007, Auld was told in a letter written from Portland city officials
that his sign violated a city code that prohibited signs on single residential houses. That
city ordinance is located in title 32 of the Portland city code and charter. The specific
subsection the city cited that Auld was in violation of is in subsection 32.32.010. That
subsection states that houses, duplexes and attached houses are only allowed one sign per
property and that sign can only have a maximum sign face area of one square foot. Signs
are also not allowed to be placed higher than ten feet. 7 Auld was informed that if he did
not take the sign down by May 14, 2007, he was going to be fined $50 per day. 8
On the day Auld received the letter from the City of Portland he decided to take
the sign off his roof. Auld then placed the sign on a nearby fence. Auld was then told by
city officials that due to the same code as previously stated that he was not allowed to
keep the sign anywhere on his property where it could be visible to the public.
Because of all the media coverage, Auld decided to take the sign down without
fighting the city to keep it up. The sign had been shown on various television news
stations, including KATU, and local newspapers such as The Oregonian. “I had made my
point,” Auld said. Auld was happy that because of all the media coverage on local
television news stations many more people than he had expected were able to see the sign
7
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and how he felt about his loss of privacy.
Case Law Analysis
Time, Place and Manner Restrictions
In a series of decisions the United States Supreme Court has said that the
government can exercise prior restraint on certain types of communication based on the
time, place or manner of the communication if there is a substantial state interest. To be
able to do this the rules the government puts into place must meet a set of four criteria so
that no First Amendment rights are violated.
The first criterion states that, “the rule must be neutral as to content, or what the
courts call content neutral, both on its face and in the manner in which it is applied.” 9
This means that it does not matter what is said or printed, but the rule must apply equally
to all communications. An example of a law that was found by the courts to be a violation
of this criterion was when a town passed an ordinance that prohibited property owners
from placing political signs on their property, unless it was within 30 days before an
election. This law was not content neutral because it only regulated political speech and
not other types of signs. 10 If an ordinance does not meet this criterion then it could be
subject to the strict scrutiny standard of judicial review that requires the government to
prove not just a substantial state interest, but a compelling state interest.
The second criterion states that rules must not constitute a complete ban on a kind
of communication. An example of this criterion being violated can be found in several

9
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court rulings. In one case a city statute banned exit polling that was being conducted by
the local newspaper. This statute was struck down because the statute would constitute a
complete ban on a specific type of communication. Reporters trying to find out
information of voter turnout would not be able to get the same information elsewhere. 11
For a ban to not violate the First Amendment there must be other ways of accomplishing
the same communication.
The third criterion states that there must be a substantial state interest to justify the
restraint on speech. For example, there have been attempts by cities to ban the
distribution of pamphlets because they can create a litter problem. The courts decided that
this is not considered a legitimate concern because the litter can be dealt with by other
means, such as enforcing anti-litter laws. 12 On the other hand, a ban on the use of
loudspeakers after 10 p.m. could be justified because people are trying to sleep at that
hour of the night, which is a substantial state interest. The city, state or federal law that
applies to restraint on speech must have a legitimate reason to justify that the restraint in
necessary. 13
The forth criterion that must be met is that, “the law must be narrowly tailored so
that is furthers the state interest that justifies it, but does not restrain more expression than
is actually required to further this interest.” 14 In one case that dealt with this criterion, a
city passed an ordinance that banned the distribution of free, printed material in yards,
driveways and porches in an attempt to stop a particular newspaper from cluttering up
11
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gutters and streets. Instead of just preventing the problematic paper, the ordinance also
prevented any free material from being distributed in the same manner. For this reason
the law was not narrowly tailored because as it restrained more expression than was
actually required to further the state’s interest. The city could have instead required
people to pick up their papers or fined the paper for any unclaimed papers.15
A law that deals with prior restrain due to time, place and manner needs to be able
to meet all of these criteria so that it does not violate the First Amendment. Depending
upon where the speech in question is taking place determines the manner in which the
court may apply the four criterions.16
Oregon State Constitution
“Over the past 50 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has given the states broad
latitude to set their own laws regarding free speech.” 17 Because of this the laws that
govern the freedom of expression vary considerably from state to state. Article one,
section eight of the Oregon Constitution states that:
No law shall be passed restraining the free expression of opinion, or
restricting the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject
whatever; but every person shall be responsible for the abuse of this
right. 18
With these words the framers of the Oregon Constitution gave their citizens even more
free speech rights than those provided by the U.S. Constitution. Oregon’s guarantee of
15
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free speech is actually considered one of the broadest in the country. It is also considered
to be one of the strongest constitutional guarantees of free speech. 19
Because Oregon’s constitutional guarantee of free speech is so broad, there are
many ongoing controversies arising from it.
Past Cases: Signs
In 1994 the U.S. Supreme Court was faced with a case that is strikingly similar to
that of Auld’s; that case involved Margaret Gilleo. Gilleo, who owned a single-family
home in Ladue, Missouri, put a 24 by 36-inch sign on her front lawn that said, “Say No to
War in the Persian Gulf, Call Congress Now.” Soon after Gilleo put up the sign, it
disappeared. She then put up another sign, but that one also disappeared. Gilleo reported
the incidents to the police but was informed by then that signs of that nature were
prohibited inside of city limits. 20
Gilleo decided to take action, and the District Court issued a preliminary
injunction against the city ordinance that prohibited her from displaying her sign. After
the injunction Gilleo placed an 8.5 by 11-inch sign in her window that read, “For Peace in
the Persian Gulf.” The City of Laude responded by repealing the old city ordinance,
which the court had placed an injunction on, and enacted a new, revised city ordinance.
This ordinance prohibited all residential signs, allowing for only 10 exemptions such as
residential identification signs and “for sale” signs. Gilleo then amended her complaint to
challenge the new ordinance. 21 This is a violation of one of the guidelines for time, place
19
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and manner restrictions because these exemptions make the ordinance not content
neutral.
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Gilleo by ruling that the city ordinance
violated her First Amendment guarantee to freedom of expression. Justice John Paul
Stevens delivered the opinion of the court.
Stevens wrote, “Ladue has almost completely foreclosed a venerable means of
communication that is both unique and important.” 22 Signs that express a view or react
to a local controversial issue reflect and animate changes in the life of the community.
Residential signs have long been an important medium for expression.
The City of Laude argued that the ordinance was a regulation of time, place and
manner because residents were still capable of using other mediums to express their
ideas. The court addressed this concern by stating that residential signs are often a cheap
and convenient form of communication, especially for people who have limited mobility
or modest means. Other forms of communication such as printing leaflets or taking out
advertising space in a newspaper may be far too costly for many people to do. Activities
such as handing out the leaflets and holding protests or speeches may also be
unreasonable for people who have disabilities preventing them from doing so. Also,
residential signs are meant to reach a certain audience that might not be able to be
reached as effectively by any other means. 23
The government does have the right to impose regulations on signs in residential
22
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neighborhoods if they have legitimate concerns, but the city’s ordinance prohibiting all
signs violated the First Amendment. With more “temperate measures,” the City of Laude
could satisfy their regulatory needs without violating their citizens’ right to free speech. 24
Past Cases- Expletives
The U.S. Supreme Court has also dealt with issues arising from offensive
messages, or for lack of a better term, swearwords. In 1971a 19-year-old named Paul
Cohen wore a jacket that expressed his ideas about the Vietnam War. The jacket was
emblazoned with the words “Fuck the Draft. Stop the War.” He was charged under a
California statute, convicted, and sentenced to 30 days in jail. The statute prohibited,
“maliciously and willfully disturb[ing] the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person
[by] offensive conduct.” 25 The court found that although the phrase on the jacket is
provocative, it is not directed at any one person. There was also no evidence that “people
in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words
on his jacket.” 26 There was no evidence that anyone who saw the jacket, or was likely to
see it, could have reasonably regarded the words as an insult because the message was
not directed at any one person. 27
The court also made a distinction between the use of vulgar language and
obscenity, which the government has been given more power to regulate. For a state to
use its “power to prohibit obscene expression, such expression must be, in some
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significant way, erotic.” 28
The State of California made the argument that the state had a legitimate concern
to act because the “distasteful” remark was thrust unwillingly upon its viewers. This
argument was not held by the court because there was no intrusion of privacy. The
government’s ability to stop dialogue solely in the interest of protection other from
hearing is “dependent upon showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded
in an essentially intolerable manner.” 29
Discussion
The type of speech that Auld displayed on his roof was political speech. Even if
people did not like the expletive he used, there is no doubt that the topic he was referring
to was a highly contentious issue for the people living in his area and around the Portland
metropolitan area. The Meikeljohnian theory of the First amendment states that political
speech should get absolute protection, while all other types of speech must be balanced
with other societal concerns. 30 What makes this statute unconstitutional is that it does not
meet the criteria set forth for time, place and manner restrictions.
The Portland city statute that regulates signs in residential areas does meet the
first criterion in that the law is content neutral. The statute does not have any language
that provides a guideline for what types of language is or is not allowed. There is also no
sign ordinance that states that expletives are or are not permitted. In fact, the statute
prohibits all signs that have a face area larger than one square foot. The statute also
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prohibits signs that are placed higher than ten feet off the ground. 31
The statute is also an almost complete ban on residential signs. For many
properties in Portland, a sign that is smaller than one square foot would not be able to be
legible from the street. In Laude v. Gilleo Justice Stevens wrote in his opinion that signs
are a valuable means of communication for many people. For many, signs are cheap, easy
to use and for people with disabilities or financial restraints, can be the only way to
effectively communicate their ideas. “[R]esidential signs have long been an important
and distinct medium of expression.” 32 This statute almost completely bans this entire type
of communication, which makes it a violation of this time, place and manner criterion.
This statute also does not meet the third and fourth criterions of time, place and
manner restriction, that the law must justify a substantial state interest and the law must
be narrowly tailored as to not restrain more expression than is required to further its
interest. 33 The City of Portland’s interest in protect unlimited proliferation of residential
signs which might create “visual clutter” is not enough of a substantial state interest to
prohibit such an important means of communication. The Supreme Court has ruled that in
situations like this there are more temperate measures a city can use to satisfy their
interest in regulation visual clutter. 34
Conclusion
As the Portland statute which regulates residential signs stands today, all signs on
houses, duplexes and attached houses cannot have a face area larger than one square foot.
31
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This means that people would not be able to have “Happy Birthday” banners, “It’s a
Boy” signs or even house identification number signs larger than one square foot.
By taking away our right to have signs with a face area larger than one square
foot, statute 32.32.010 also prohibits one of the most common forms of political speech.
Under this law it is technically illegal to fly the standard size United States flag on private
property. In our democratic form of society political speech is one of the greatest rights
we are all guaranteed. “The guarantee of freedom of speech and freedom of the press
were added to the Constitution in large measure to protect political debate in the nation
from government interference.” 35
Another freedom this statute infringes upon is the right to support candidates for
public office. Many Americans choose to do this by placing signs in their windows and
on their lawns during a candidate’s campaign, but city statute 32.32.010 prohibits these
signs if they have a face area larger than one square foot. Because this statute is
prohibiting political speech, it is certainly unconstitutional. “[P]olitical speech is at the
top of the First Amendment hierarchy of expression.” 36 This means that political speech
is given the highest priority for protection under the First Amendment.
Even if the City of Portland was trying to protect its citizens from vulgar language
with this statute there are no substantial privacy interest that Auld is invading upon,
which is the only reason the government can use to stop dialogue solely in the interest of
protecting others from hearing it. 37 In fact it is Auld’s privacy that the city invaded upon.
The statute that the City of Portland cited in Auld’s case does not meet three of
35
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the criterions for time, place and manner restrictions which makes the statute
unconstitutional under both the United States Constitution and the Oregon Constitution.
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Appendix I
(The following is a copy of code 32.32.010 as listed on the Online Code and Charter from
the Portland City Auditors Office.)
32.32.010 Standards in the Residential Zones and Open Space Zone.

A. General standards. The standards for permanent signs in the RF through RH zones and
for the IR and OS zones are stated in Table 1. The sign standards for the RX zone are
stated in Table 2. All signs must conform to the regulations of Section 32.32.030.

B. Sign features. Signs in the RF through RH zones and in the IR and OS zones, except
for those subject to the CN zone sign standards, are subject to the standards of this
subsection. Illuminated signs placed in windows are subject to these sign regulations.
Extensions into the right-of-way are prohibited. Changing image sign features are
prohibited and only indirect lighting is allowed.
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